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Denaturalizing Digital Platforms: 
Is Mass Individualization Here to Stay? 
 
 
This paper examines the consistency of mass individualization or “personalization” 
techniques used by digital platforms with the imaginaries and logics of neoclassical 
economic theory and behavioral economics. We identify limitations of contemporary 
policy and regulatory responses to harms associated with datafication practices.  We 
argue that more attention needs to be given to denaturalizing claims that enhancements 
of mass individualization techniques are a “natural” outcome of digital technology 
innovation and market dynamics. To avoid harms associated with datafication and to 
secure public values, it is essential to imagine a future digital world that is not 
dependent on massive collection of individuals’ data for commercial or public ends. 
This might require the blocking of some applications before, rather than after, they have 
been deployed. Doing so will require broad agreement that mass individualization 
techniques are inconsistent with valuing human autonomy and effective individual 
choice in Western societies. Skepticism regarding policy intervention in the platform 
market is answered by examining how surprising opportunities for change may arise 
from contestations of current applications of these technologies.  
 
Keywords: digital platform, innovation, personalization, mass individualization, 
competition policy, regulation 
 
  
	 	
Introduction 
 
“Mass individualization” is a key goal of processes designed to enhance 
business relationships with customers in online and offline markets. Described in the 
customer relationship management context as mass customization or personalization, 
this is a central research theme in the marketing and management literatures.1 It is this 
research that informs the practices of many of today’s dominant digital platforms. Mass 
individualization strategies have blossomed as artificial intelligence-enabled customer 
relationship management techniques have emerged as the centerpiece of online 
business operations with massive research investments designed to improve the 
platforms’ abilities to target their advertising messages.  
 
Critical analysis of digital innovation identifies these trends with the harms of 
“datafication”, “surveillance capitalism” and “data colonialism” (Couldry & Mejias, 
2019; van Dijck, Poell, & de Waal, 2018; Zuboff, 2019). These analyses are 
underpinned by the theory that the development and implementation of all technologies 
are political (Winner, 1986), and there are many elaborations of this perspective. 
Building upon, but setting a different focus, this paper considers how neoclassical 
economic theory and its close variant — behavioral economics — perpetuate an 
imaginary that reinforces and sustains claims that digital mass individualization 
techniques necessarily offer improved social and economic outcomes.2 This imaginary 
is so pervasive that it creates a “blind spot” in the deliberations of policy makers who 
are often sympathetic to claims of harm associated with these techniques, but unwilling 
to consider radical change in the rules governing online business practice. Instead, 
much more modest efforts to mitigate the harmful effects of these techniques appear as 
the only option for policy. 
 
1 For example, a Google Scholar search for the term customer relationship management 
in the title of articles in November 2019 yielded 127 papers in the decade 1990-99, 
4,380 in the decade 2000-09 and 6,360 for the decade 2010-19. ‘Personalization’ yields 
297 papers in 1990-99, 3,230 in 2000-09, and 5,250 in 2010-19. 
2 Imaginary here refers to the normative notions about how socio-technical 
relationships should operate, see Mansell (2012). 
	 	
 
If harms that critical scholars associate with mass individualization techniques 
are to be avoided in the medium and long term, we suggest that radical change will be 
needed that goes beyond measures being considered in (Western) digital platform 
regulatory and policy contexts. Certain applications of these techniques should not be 
permitted until such time as effective governance arrangements are in place. This is 
unlikely in the short term and some will see any such step as unrealistic. This 
provocation is essential, however, to encourage greater awareness of the potential for 
alternative imaginaries to emerge through ongoing contestation around the private and 
public uses of these techniques. It is only by insisting on the need to imagine radical 
alternatives that critiques of digital platform practices are likely to dislodge the notion 
from its present hegemonic position. Mass individualization techniques need not be a 
“natural” outcome of innovation and market dynamics. “Denaturalizing” this notion is 
necessary to enable a full debate about the future of data-enabled societies that might 
lead to new practices. 
 
The next section introduces mass individualization techniques and their salience 
for digital platforms. This is followed by a discussion of how neoclassical-inspired 
economic theories underpin imaginaries about the benefits of these techniques and also 
are employed to diminish the claims of harms associated with them. The penultimate 
section discusses the value and limits of policy and regulatory responses to platform 
practices in the areas of privacy protection, content moderation and competition policy. 
The aim of these policies and regulations is to mitigate harms associated with the use 
of mass individualization techniques in both their commercial and public 
implementations. Finally, in the concluding section, the reasons that radical change in 
policy and practice is needed are summarized and the likelihood that new imaginaries 
will emerge to guide such change is assessed.  
 
Mass Individualization and Digital Platforms 
 
A core aim of mass individualization is the efficient management of customer 
relationships in the interests of corporate growth and profitability. Increasing attention 
to this facet of business management coincided with the opening of the internet to 
	 	
commercial use in the mid-1990s and the development of e-commerce for buying and 
selling online.3 While customer profiling pre-dates the internet, the aim always has been 
to amass as much information as possible about customers to support the customization 
of goods or services in response to what is understood to be customer “demand”; the 
idea that people have information available to them sufficient to make rational (or even 
semi-rational) choices. Today, the principal aims of customer profiling are to enhance 
customer experience and to stimulate engagement with online platforms. The 
techniques of mass individualization are the means for this enhancement and 
stimulation. They involve collecting and processing data, identifying similarities and 
differences among individuals and targeting people at varying levels of granularity. 
“Personalization” or mass individualization is treated as an efficient means of building 
ever better customer relationships (Mansell & Steinmueller, in press). 
 
These techniques promise benefits to consumers or citizens including 
convenience, price comparison and online communication with “friends” or political 
parties. From the mid-1990s onwards, relatively few checks on the development of 
mass individualization techniques were introduced, although privacy legislation put 
some constraints on personal data collection.4 In much of the marketing and 
management literature that informed business investment in these techniques, it is 
assumed that the profiles created by capturing and analyzing data are a reasonable 
proxy for people’s identities and preferences (Bleier, De Keyser, & Verleye, 2017). 
 
Digital platform owners have been refining mass individualization techniques 
and pursuing the goal of greater efficiency by attracting users to their platform 
interfaces and deepening their engagement. This is achieved through both active and 
passive collection of data and the uses for these data now extend well beyond e-
commerce to include politics, public health, social policy and law enforcement. 
Customer relationship management is about retaining users (customers or citizens), 
identifying those who are likely to be influenced and encouraging them to affiliate with 
 
3 See Koren, Shpitalni, Gu, & Hu (2015), Vesanen, 2007; Zhang & Wedel (2009). 
4 See Bennett & Raab (2018) for history of data and privacy protection policy and 
legislation. 
	 	
the brands of online service providers, banks or social media platforms such as Amazon 
or Facebook. These processes support the attention economy and they have come to be 
seen as crucial for a thriving digital or data economy (EC, 2020d; Wu, 2016). Whether 
the customer relationship concerns cars, computer hardware, computer games, 
insurance or financial services, the goal is to provide a “personal” buying experience 
enabled by cost-effective artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies 
(Mansell & Steinmueller, in press). New kinds of human-machine interfaces are being 
envisaged with the capacity to further augment “personalization”, for example, when 
cyber-physical systems such as mobile phones, the internet of things and sensor 
networks are linked with people (Pathak, Pal, Shrivastava, & Ora, 2019).  
 
In this context, the need for customer privacy is treated as a relatively 
uncomplicated trade-off. This trade-off may require complex judgements, but it is 
deemed ultimately to be manageable.5 Numerous developments in privacy protection 
technologies recognize that securing data to understand a customer’s preference for a 
product (or political party) involves ethical considerations. However, this is typically 
interpreted as a requirement to make it possible for the customer to trust that a supplier 
will target individuals in ways that the individual perceives as yielding meaningful 
matches. 6 Online suppliers of goods and services, including digital platforms, are 
expected to ensure that trust is not lost since a loss of trust will jeopardize their brand 
and market position. Insofar as there is a competitive threat to a company’s position in 
the market, the aim is to win a race to develop next-generation technologies to maintain 
a market leadership position (EC, 2020e). In the marketing and management literature, 
innovative advances in mass individualization are envisaged as a positive “natural” 
evolutionary step toward, for example, “cobots” (collaborative robots), and the 
 
5 See Bednar, Spiekermann, & Langheinrich (2019), Morley, Floridi, Kinsey, & Elhalal 
(2019). 
6 See Scalable Oblivious Data Analytics (SODA), retrieved from https://www.soda-
project.eu/ and Ethical and Societal Implications of Data Sciences (e-SIDES), retrieved 
from https://e-sides.eu/ 
 
	 	
resulting customer-centric human-machine symbiosis is assumed to be empowering for 
humans and machines (Pathak, et al., 2019).  
 
Neoclassical-inspired economic theories bolster this imaginary of mass 
individualization in multiple ways and these are discussed in the next section.  
 
The Hegemony of Neoclassical-Inspired Economic Theories 
 
Assumptions underpinning neoclassical-inspired economic theories sustain 
mass individualization imaginaries and the technical developments that enable digital 
platforms to position themselves as delivering efficient (and by implication, consumer 
welfare enhancing) outcomes for their users and the economy.  
 
In the neoclassical theoretical account, enhanced mass individualization 
techniques are conceived as a productive way to achieve economic growth that is 
assumed to be consistent with the well-being of all individuals. If these techniques are 
imperfect at present, they are also subject to “improvement.” Artificial intelligence-
enabled algorithms are understood as neutral drivers of innovation. This neutrality is a 
consequence of the assumption that individuals have pre-existing preferences that can 
be revealed through the techniques of customer profiling (e.g. their clicks and web 
surfing behavior). Through the revelation of preferences, participation on a platform 
facilitates an optimal matching of supply and demand. Consumers are assumed to freely 
give their consent to allow the supplier to do what is necessary to facilitate their 
experience by collecting and processing their data. The individual is assumed to have 
made a rational choice to participate online and to have the requisite information to 
make such a choice. Power asymmetries or inequalities in consumer or citizen abilities 
to make choices are assumed to erode over time as market forces play themselves out.  
 
The result is a reinforcement cycle that enables a supplier to capture and employ 
user-related data to intensify the user’s experience. As Andrejevic (2019, p. 11) says, 
“if targeted ads get it wrong, if police surveillance fails to accurately predict criminal 
activity, then these outcomes are repeatedly attributed to incomplete or inaccurate 
information: the system just needs to know everyone better.” The production and 
	 	
consumption of digital content – entertainment and news – have been radically altered 
through the use of these techniques. Free-to-air broadcasting and traditional print 
journalism migrated online with access enabled by mobile and “over-the-top” platform 
services that rely heavily upon profiling of individuals (Lobato, 2019). Dominated in 
the West by companies such as Facebook, YouTube, Hulu, Netflix and Amazon Prime, 
there is still some competition (Donders, et al., 2018) as, for example, when Netflix 
faces competition from Disney+ and others. The exogenous shock of innovation-
inspired competition might make Netflix’s dominance in the market ephemeral if 
novelties emerge and are introduced by another company. These companies are 
assumed to be continuously innovating to improve their offer to consumers using mass 
individualization techniques to improve the appeal of their content in local and global 
markets (Roxborough, 2019: np). If the entry of American-owned companies into the 
European market, for example, sparks market consolidation as local or national 
companies scale up to compete (Evens, 2014), this is treated within this theoretical 
framework as a positive and “natural” outcome of dynamic competition. 
 
In the case of news media, where the tradition is an advertiser-supported 
business model in the Western countries (sometimes with state subsidy), journalism 
relies on building relationships with readers. Mass individualization techniques provide 
a means to target or personalize news. The leading digital platforms have been faster in 
adopting artificial intelligence-based matching techniques than the incumbent news 
organizations, establishing themselves as news aggregators. As late entrants to the use 
of these techniques, the news industry has been unable to scale up its own platforms 
and is largely dependent on the dominant platforms (Beckett, 2019; Bell & Owen, 
2017). Within the neoclassical framing, the platforms’ success is attributed to 
innovation and the efficiency of their profiling and matching algorithms. The decline 
of the older news industry is symptomatic of the failure of that industry to adjust to the 
exogenous shocks of technological innovation. The decline is taken as being illustrative 
of the “natural” process of “creative destruction.”  
 
In this economics account, consumers are sovereign and deemed to be free to 
choose what entertainment content or news they watch or read. The efficiencies enabled 
by mass individualization techniques support company growth and profitability 
	 	
(Varian, 2016). Rising platform use is taken as evidence that the “winning” company 
or industry is using mass individualization techniques in an efficient way, at least 
compared to others. The evidence is supplied by the theory’s assumptions and the 
imaginary can be sustained even if evidence emerges that leading companies are 
behaving in unfair or anticompetitive ways. Such evidence provides a case for reform, 
not for a fundamental restructuring of the rules governing platform operation. 
 
Neoclassical economic theory allows some flexibility in accounting for new 
developments to allow a more realistic and nuanced account of the dynamics of 
competition.7 Thus, for instance, behavioral or cognitive economics adds a dimension 
of psychological realism to the theory by relaxing the assumption that consumers have 
pre-formed and immutable preferences or can be counted upon to act rationally 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Young, 2018). This has led to ideas about how to 
influence individual behavior (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009) and to research on cognitive 
bias and predilections that contradict rational calculation (Bourgine, 2004; Kimball, 
2015). In this variant of economics, individuals’ preferences are not assumed to be 
exogenous or immutable; they can be “nudged” using mass individualization 
techniques. It is also recognized that individuals do not have complete information or 
knowledge and that the distribution of information can be uneven. These assumptions 
open a new frontier for managing customers and citizens. Large firms can finance 
research and development, attract skilled workers and innovate with the specific aim of 
influencing preferences and nudging behavior. Rather than being seen as a threat of 
anticompetitive behavior, the contribution of these developments to market 
concentration is interpreted as further evidence of the need for large scale operations to 
harness the opportunities for improved efficiency. If supra-normal profits are achieved 
in this process, they are called innovative rents, and justified as a necessary invention 
to fuel innovation (Ellig & Lin, 2001). 
 
 
7 A pluralist or multidisciplinary economics embraces post-Keynesian, Marxist, 
Austrian, Institutional (new and old), Feminist, Behavioural and Complexity 
economics, see Fischer, et al. (2018) and Keizer (2015). 
	 	
Introducing these assumptions leaves the neoclassical economics edifice largely 
intact. It is still assumed that processes of innovation and competitive dynamics 
produce greater consumer welfare. The focus remains individualistic and it is assumed 
that the private appropriation of individuals’ data is justified in order to ensure thriving 
markets. The platform companies demonstrating such superior performance at a given 
time may be vulnerable to malicious behavior and they may incur costs in governing 
this behavior. These costs may include hiring human moderators to filter user-produced 
content or for developing efficient algorithms for content moderation. Vulnerabilities 
that affect platform growth or profitability can be interpreted as inefficiencies with a 
market solution. Platform operations that lead to other harms (not directly affecting 
platform growth or profitability) such as misinformation, online incivility or increasing 
precarity in the lives of workers (Trust Truth and Technology Commission, 2018), are 
outside the economic framework and relegated to become the concern of some type of 
regulation. 
 
These theoretical framings also are used to explain why a platform company 
benefits from economies of scale and scope as a result of network effects and its use 
mass individualization techniques. On the one hand, a Schumpeterian account of 
competitive dynamics suggests that creative destruction will lead to new entry driven 
by entrepreneurs. The assumption is that a dominant company like Google will be 
replaced by a competitive alternative that makes the most creative use of an algorithm 
or customer interface with its platform. On the other hand, a Schumpeterian view of 
creative destruction can also be used to argue that large companies have the greatest 
resources to devote to technology innovation (Schumpeter, 1947).8 As long as Google 
 
8 In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter entertained the idea that large 
companies might be able to institutionalise the innovation process and thereby 
effectively end the creative destruction process. He argued that a consequence of this 
would be that society would need to bring these companies under social control in order 
to preserve democracy. Although sometimes identified as an Austrian School 
economist, Schumpeter’s views are closely aligned with Friedrich Hayek who saw a 
role for the state in providing a social safety net while most other Austrian economists 
are more aligned with libertarian political theory. 
	 	
or Facebook continue to attract users, it is imagined that they will not be replaced and 
this provides a rationale for non-interference in the platform market (Bork & Sidak, 
2012). Behavioral economics departs from this view by acknowledging the endogeneity 
of preferences and provides a foundation for challenging platform market dominance 
through interventions designed to stimulate the emergence of competitors (Wu, 2016).  
 
In both these neoclassical theoretical framings, it is assumed that the optimal 
way to exploit opportunities afforded by mass individualization is through corporate 
appropriation of data. To succeed, a company has an obligation to design technologies 
that enable it to operate in a way that maximizes economic value. Competitive 
dynamics are indicative of economic success – whether of a set of smaller intensely 
competing companies or of a “natural monopoly.” Considerations of inequality or 
injustice associated with the processing of data are not part of these analytical models. 
As Tirole (2017, p. 57) puts it, on questions about what kind of data or digital economy 
is desirable, economists have “little to say, except as an ordinary citizen.” 
 
Harms in the form of privacy invasions, unwanted surveillance or declining 
abilities of individuals to understand the operation of the techniques of mass 
individualization did not go unnoticed during the early phases of enhancements in 
computer processing power and their application. Consistent with the view that 
technologies are imbricated with politics (Winner, 1986), in the pre-digital platform 
days, these strategies were widely criticized in the scholarly literature. The notion that 
personalization should be achieved using “voluntary” mass data collection techniques 
was problematized as a strategy to “develop systems that replace societal decisions 
governing life, liberty, and opportunity” (Andrejevic, 2007, p. 12). Asymmetries in the 
power relationships between individuals and platform service suppliers intent on 
marketing goods and services were criticized as untransparent methods of social control 
(Mansell, 1994). For example, methods of “designing” e-commerce using these 
techniques were depicted as new ways of “capturing” customers and as harbingers of a 
major step shift in the achievement of “surveillance by design” (Gandy Jr., 1993; Lyon, 
1994; Mansell, 1996; Samarajiva, 1996; Zuboff, 1988).  
 
 
	 	
 
The scholarly literature is replete with critical examinations of asymmetrical 
customer/citizen-supplier relationships that emerged with the growth of platform 
companies such as Amazon, Google, Facebook and many others (Andrejevic, 2019; 
Couldry & Mejias, 2019; McGuigan & Manzerolle, 2014; van Dijck, et al., 2018; 
Zuboff, 2019). Multiple government reports cite academics who challenge both the 
assumptions and insights of neoclassical and behavioral economics. When they do so 
it is not assumed that platforms operate in a neutral bubble of economic supply and 
demand. Nor is it assumed that the use of mass individualization techniques is always 
intended to maximize consumer welfare. The digital platforms are understood to have 
the power to set the terms for platform access and use and for the collection and 
processing data. Even if individuals appear to derive pleasure from their online 
experiences, in these analytical traditions it is recognized that this is an 
“institutionalized audience” (Napoli, 2011), constructed out of opaque techniques of 
online relationship-building for the purposes of selling “persons”. Mass 
individualization practices are also implicated as an exploitative class-based form of 
contemporary capitalism (McGuigan & Manzerolle, 2014).  
 
The marketing and management literatures report work at the leading edge of 
developments in mass individualization techniques. What is absent in this literature is 
the critical scholarly concepts such as “datafication” or a “culture of surveillance” that 
signal uses of invasive techniques and individual and societal harms (Lyon, 2018; van 
Dijck, 2013; Zuboff, 2019). Instead, the imaginaries of the dominant economic theories 
in the marketing and management literature inspire heightened expectations for growth 
in online applications using mass individualization techniques. These crystallize in 
euphoria about the progress of artificial intelligence and a Fourth Industrial Revolution 
that portends the “fusing of physical, digital and biological worlds” (EC, 2020e; 
Schwab, 2017, p. np; US Government, 2020).  
 
Policy and Regulatory Responses 
 
These logics of neoclassical and behavioral economics also permeate the 
prevailing imaginary that conditions contemporary policy and regulatory responses to 
	 	
platform dominance. This is so even as such responses are aimed at restraining the 
digital platforms’ uses of mass individualization techniques and their market 
dominance. Critical insights arising from other traditions in economics — and from 
other disciplines — are not entirely absent, but the hegemony of neoclassical economics 
theories makes it difficult to justify interventions in the platform marketplace or to 
support alternatives to the mass individualization platform models. In some instances, 
nevertheless, policy and regulatory proposals do resonate with the insights arising from 
critical scholarship. For example, in the United Kingdom disquiet about the platforms’ 
operations, and especially Facebook’s and Google’s resistance to operating their mass 
individualization techniques in a transparent way, has led to calls for regulation “by 
outrage” (doteveryone, 2018). In both the United Kingdom and the United States, the 
large social media platforms have been labelled as “digital gangsters” and charged with 
engaging in “evil” practices. Facebook has been called a “disinformation-for-profit 
machine” and social media has been described as a “corrupt system.”9 It is also argued 
that as long as the dominant platforms are permitted to employ commercial mass 
individualization techniques “the creation of public value toward the common good” is 
jeopardized (van Dijck, et al., 2018, p. 22).  
 
Calls for market intervention to secure public values are confronted with 
imaginaries that resonate with the prevailing economic theories. The default premise is 
that insofar as the (Western) state is involved in the platform marketplace, its role 
should be to minimize restraints on platform company behavior to eliminate frictions 
that reduce the efficiency of matching of supply and demand. When these theoretical 
logics are influential, there is a predilection for corporate self-regulation. Caution 
regarding market intervention is justified by the argument that digital platforms are 
neutral gateways between content suppliers (including advertisers) and their users or 
that their capacity to nudge people is consistent with leadership in developing the data 
economy. Although critical scholarship arguably has gained relatively little traction in 
limiting the pace of innovation in mass individualization techniques, contemporary 
“outrage” is galvanizing consideration of market interventions aimed at mitigating the 
 
9 See UK Government (2018) and Senator E. Warren (as cited in Culliford, 2019, p. np) 
citing, and Senator S. Brown (as cited in Paul, 2019, p. np).  
	 	
harms associated with the leading platforms’ practices. Three domains in which the 
hegemony of the neoclassical and behavioral economics imaginary is potentially 
waning are considered here: privacy protection and content moderation; competition 
policy and antitrust enforcement; and alternative models for the provision of platforms.  
 
Privacy Protection and Content Moderation 
 
Policy makers are concerned increasingly that the mass individualization 
operations of the largest platforms have negative consequences such as targeting people 
with misinformation, enabling behaviors that are harmful to vulnerable children and 
adults, or nudging and manipulating the users of their platforms in ways that are 
disadvantageous to them. In the United Kingdom, platform self-regulation is deemed 
to be failing (UK Government, 2018, 2019a). Regulation to oversee the operations of 
digital platforms to achieve greater transparency of mass individualization techniques 
(the algorithms), especially in their application to content moderation, is being 
introduced in Europe (EC, 2020c) and, in the United States, there is controversy about 
the role of the platforms in influencing elections (Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018; 
Miers, 2020).  
 
The dilemma accompanying any new market intervention is to ensure that 
governments do not use their recognition of harms as a justification to give themselves 
powers that infringe on individuals’ rights and freedoms. Proportionate approaches are 
called for and, in some instances, proactive legislation, for example, to combat hate 
speech online is overturned. For example, the French constitutional court rejected a 
proposed regulation of social media platforms as infringing on free expression rights 
(Dillet, 2020), and there are signs that the courts will intervene in other jurisdictions. 
The contradictory social values of privacy protection and freedom of expression make 
it difficult to intervene in a way that redirects the platforms’ ongoing development of 
their mass individualization techniques. The imaginary fostered by the dominant 
neoclassical-inspired framings emphasizes to policy makers that individuals are well-
placed to reveal their preferences in the digital market or that they are happy with the 
outcomes of their online interactions. Regulatory measures are sometimes proposed as 
means of achieving algorithm neutrality, itself a notion derived from a neoclassical 
	 	
theory that only acknowledges “values” to the extent that they are reflected in the 
choices of individuals. Although the aim of policy is often to constrain the way mass 
individualization techniques operate and they can yield platform compliance, this does 
not necessarily slow the progress of innovation in this area. For example, when the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation came into effect in 2018 (EC, 
2016), it introduced a consent requirement between the platforms and their users for the 
collection of personal data. The result is a privacy protection regime characterized as a 
“pathology of consent” due to the absence of meaningful choices offered users 
(Richards & Hartzog, 2019) and technical innovations with little if any transparency 
continue to advance.  
 
Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement 
 
Responses to these platform uses of mass individualization techniques also 
include market structure remedies using competition policy. For example, an 
independent Digital Competition Expert panel in the United Kingdom has concluded 
that “competition for the market cannot be counted on, by itself, to solve the problems 
associated with market tipping and “winner-takes-most”’ with regard to platforms 
(Digital Competition Expert Panel, 2019, p. 4). This suggests a shift away from the use 
of a narrow consumer welfare test of anti-competitive behavior by the leading 
platforms. In the European Union, there are pressures to modify the criteria used to 
assess anticompetitive behavior, for example, by taking non-price factors such as 
business practices that infringe on individuals’ privacy into account (Just, 2018). Policy 
makers also are being urged to take the insights of behavioral economics into account. 
As one report for the European Commission put it, account should be taken of “the 
strength of consumers' biases toward default options and short-term gratification. … 
one may want to err on the side of disallowing potentially anticompetitive conducts, 
and impose on the incumbent the burden of proof for showing the pro-competitiveness 
of its conduct” (Crémer, de Montjoye, & Schweitzer, 2019, p. 4).  
 
In the United States there are moves toward more effective antitrust legislation 
enforcement even among those typically aligning themselves with the neoclassical-
inspired imaginary of the dynamics of competition. However, this is justified by 
	 	
stepping aside from the limiting economics framework to consider issues of political 
power and democracy or privacy (Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms, 2019). There 
also are suggestions for changing the test for anti-competitive behavior to acknowledge 
the characteristics of the attention economy (Wu, 2019), although some argue that 
existing restrictive tests of whether platform practices are harming consumer welfare 
as indicated by price movements could be used more effectively (Khan, 2017).  
 
Ambitions for stronger enforcement of competition policy are much in 
evidence. In Europe, the Directorate General for Competition has levied fines on 
Google (EC, 2019). Investigations in Europe are focusing, for example, on whether 
Apple’s rules for app developers seeking to distribute apps via its App Store and for the 
use of its Apple Pay technology violate competition rules by enabling Apple to function 
as a restrictive gatekeeper (EC, 2020a, 2020b). In the United States the Federal Trade 
Commission levied a substantial fine on Facebook (FTC, 2019) and the Justice 
Department has initiated a broad review of the practices of the market-leading online 
platforms (US Government, 2019). In the US Congress varying amounts of bipartisan 
support have been mobilized for breaking up of Google, Facebook and Amazon by 
structurally separating the communication or conveyancing side of their businesses 
from their applications businesses (McLeod, 2020). Competition policy measures, short 
of breaking up the dominant platforms, include enforcing standards of interoperability 
to increase data access and data sharing across platforms. For example, data mobility 
and interoperability standards among platforms might be required to enable individuals 
to switch to an alternative platform. Regulation to treat the platforms as “public 
utilities” or to make them liable for illegal or harmful content hosted on their platforms 
is also being given consideration (Waters, 2020).  
 
In instances of a more proactive use of competition legislation, the endogeneity 
of consumer preferences and the insights of behavioral economics offer an imaginary 
that may justify intervention in the platform market. The outcomes are likely to be 
conditioned, however, by the argument that technological innovation should not be 
suppressed. The requirements for justifying intervention set the bar high because 
investment in artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies is still assumed 
to have long-term social benefits. Together with claims of near-term consumer benefits, 
	 	
these prospects of longer-term benefits lead to caution, even if competition authorities 
agree that the platform market is unduly concentrated. This caution seeks to ensure that 
the benefits of platform innovation are not “lost through hasty, inappropriate or 
disproportionate intervention” (CMA, 2017, p. 2).  
 
Alternative Models for Platform Provision 
 
The above policy measures are complemented by efforts to develop alternative 
platform models that give priority to public values such as privacy protection and 
freedom of expression. Many of these focus on the platform ownership and on 
permitted uses of data, inspired by an imaginary that assists in envisaging that, “it is 
certainly possible to create networks that do not collect and store detailed information 
about users” (Andrejevic, 2019, p. 56), especially when mass individualization 
techniques are not subject to corporate ownership. A move to public or individual data 
ownership rules might enable data to be used in more socially productive ways 
including moves toward a more equitable economy. Initiatives to support civil society 
or public platforms are mobilized by various data justice movements with the aim of 
achieving platform governance that respects human autonomy and offers individuals 
effective or “real” individual choice instead of seducing them into providing their data 
to feed corporate mass individualization engines (Ananny & Crawford, 2018; 
Freedman, 2019; Hintz, Dencik, & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019; Segura & Waisbord, 2016; 
Trottier & Fuchs, 2015). In the media and journalism fields that rely on mass 
individualization techniques, the aim is to configure platforms to achieve “a truly public 
media — one that is genuinely accountable to and representative of publics” 
(Freedman, 2019, p. 2014) and a “public service journalism” that acknowledges its 
essential role in democracy (Pickard, 2020). 
 
In most instances, however, such alternative platforms are envisaged as 
operating adjacent to the commercial platforms. In time, they may prove to be workable 
at scale if a financing model can be put in place, but none has achieved significant scale 
so far (apart from Wikipedia or Wikinews, both of which rely on voluntary 
contributions and do not pay their contributors for their content contributions). In 
addition, the collection of individuals’ data remains central to some of these platform 
	 	
alternatives. As public service media work to retain their audiences, and especially 
younger viewers (UK Government, 2019b), they are innovating with mass 
individualization techniques. For example, Britbox, the digital video subscription-
based platform launched by BBC Studios and ITV plc employs mass individualization 
techniques to target users and serve advertisements to them. The BBC’s Data Insights 
Division is involved in data-led design, experimentation and audience analysis using 
data analytics to increase the BBC’s platform “signed in” users to promote relevant 
content (Mari, 2019). In these instances of publicly owned platforms, users are being 
surveilled and data are being collected and justified by a commitment to the public 
values that define the BBC’s mission. This use of mass individualization techniques 
reinforces the citizens’ habit of yielding their data to a platform so that they can be 
targeted.  
 
Various alternative platform models provide for individual data ownership or 
collective data management as a means of achieving “data dignity” (Lanier & Weyl, 
2018),10 but imaginaries of the benefits of the techniques of mass individualization 
remain present in these the models even if they are inspired by theories critical of 
corporate ownership. There can be no guarantee that collective governance favoring 
public values will be immune to harmful or discriminatory data collection and 
monitoring processes and outcomes, not the least because the algorithms embedded in 
the techniques are not transparent. These efforts to grow alternative platforms are 
engaged in nudging individuals in ways that bear a strong resemblance to the corporate 
use of these techniques, albeit with the expectation of achieving public good. Whether 
deployed in support of media and journalism or in any other activity, alternative models 
of mass individualization sustain the view that the benefits of advanced implementations 
of these techniques outweigh the risk of harm. In this regard, this view is uncomfortably 
reminiscent of the imaginary that is inculcated by the hegemonic economic theories 
because the basic assumption is that the application of datafication techniques can 
sustain outcomes consistent (on balance) with citizen welfare and democracy and that 
individuals are positioned to make effective choices.  
 
10 See https://solid.mit.edu/ and https://www.hubofallthings.com/	 accessed 14 June 
2020.	
	 	
 
Conclusion: Toward a Radical Rethinking 
 
Technology-enabled mass individualization today is largely driven by digital 
platform and data analytics companies in the private sector. Policy measures seek to 
mitigate the harmful outcomes associated with commercial platform use of mass 
individualization techniques. Alternative platform models are deploying similar 
techniques, subject to public ownership or individual data ownership and collective 
governance arrangements to secure public values. The imaginary inspired by the 
dominant economic theories is underpinning individual monitoring on a grand scale 
and this is assumed to be acceptable when it is motivated by a contribution to the 
collective good. The neoclassical and behavioral economics theories posit efficiency 
and consumer welfare gains as the outcome, whereas alternative platform initiatives 
posit greater effectiveness in achieving public interest goals.  
 
Consider the option of not permitting mass individualization techniques at all; 
that is, restricting their use in certain contexts (such as health protection) or an outright 
ban on passive collection and processing of data generated by individuals’ online 
interactions. This may seem an unrealistic recommendation, but there already are signs 
of a willingness to block certain applications. For example, demands have been made 
to block the use of facial recognition technology by police forces in Europe (Shead, 
2020). Examples of uses of some of the features of these technologies that do not 
involve collection of data about individuals or seek to minimize it do exist; for instance, 
decentralized covid-19 apps that do not share personal data with authorities. Efforts to 
halt the data collection that feeds centralized versions of these apps are being blocked 
by policy as in the case of Norway when the Data Protection Authority found that the 
covid-19 track and trace app was unjustifiably privacy invasive and the public health 
authority stopped the practice (Hoeksma, 2020). In the United Kingdom, a similar app 
was abandoned before it was launched nationwide and some countries in Europe have 
opted for decentralized approaches.  
  
Overall, however, both corporate and public approaches to the use of mass 
individualization leave behavioral manipulation largely unchallenged. The progressive 
	 	
advancement of mass individualization techniques stays intact since the imaginary of 
inevitable technological progress is not being confronted in a way that effectively 
denaturalizes it. This is because wider questions about whether societies might be 
organized in a way that is not heavily dependent on artificial intelligence-enabled 
prediction engines is rarely discussed. A convincing imaginary of how these techniques 
might be designed to avert harms associated with intensive and unaccountable data 
collection and surveillance is not prominent in policy debate beyond considerations of 
privacy protection.  
 
Contemporary policy initiatives that align with, or do not challenge, the 
prevailing economic logics concerning the role of data in Western societies cannot 
succeed in directing technological innovation away from furthering the development of 
mass individualization techniques. Competition policy proceedings may restrain future 
platform mergers and acquisitions or break up the dominant platforms into smaller 
operating entities, but they do not deter the development of these techniques. Privacy 
legislation may be upgraded to curtail certain invasive practices with a reduction in 
some of the harms associated with the platforms’ operations. But the zeitgeist of 
monitoring individual behavior for profit or for social good shows few signs of 
diminishing. Policy responses and the initiatives by public and collective civil society 
actors do little to forestall the refinement of techniques that are less and less susceptible 
to external (and perhaps even internal) control because of their dependence on artificial 
intelligence-enabled systems that infringe on the basic autonomy of human beings. 
 
Mass individualization techniques are developing within the imaginary logics 
of a “natural” innovation process even when attention is given to enforcing respect for 
public values. If the prevailing imaginary about the benefits of mass individualization 
is not challenged, the possibility of human autonomy is likely to decline. Imaginaries 
of alternative futures not based on the massive and intrusive data collection 
requirements of mass individualization are needed in parallel with near-term politically 
viable harm mitigating measures. The human imagination surely can conjure 
alternatives. For this to happen, there will be a need to shift away from neoclassical-
inspired imaginaries through a reassessment of the “moral limits” (Kant, 1785/2012) of 
techniques and practices of the commercial digital platforms, and of their public and 
	 	
collective platform counterparts. Their uses of mass individualization — whether for 
profit or for social good — operate by stealth. They are predicated on asymmetric 
access to information. They also disable people’s capacities to make choices about their 
lives in a meaningful way. Any such break on the progress of artificial intelligence-
enabled mass individualization is unlikely, however, if people do not come to recognize 
that “their current situation is unacceptable” (Manyozo, 2017, p. 28).  
 
When it is acknowledged that resistance can emerge through questioning and 
debate about the benefits and harms of mass individualization techniques (Cammaerts 
& Mansell, 2020), it is feasible to consider alternative digitized worlds that would favor 
emancipation from datafication practices that limit human autonomy. It may be argued 
that mass individual monitoring and surveillance of human populations have social 
value as in the case of “sousveillance” (Mann, Nolan, & Wellman, 2003) or when used 
in control systems that limit environmental degradation or the spread of disease. 
However, because there is little evidence that harms associated with these technologies 
can be mitigated effectively, measures are needed urgently to halt the encroachment of 
these techniques into citizen’s lives. In answer to the question in the title of this paper, 
it is unlikely that alternative imaginaries will take hold on a scale substantial enough to 
suppress prevailing imaginaries of the “natural outcomes” of digital technology 
innovation in the short term. Although commercial and publicly supported mass 
individualization is here to stay for some time to come, this is not an inevitable outcome. 
Future imaginaries could give rise to novel policies and practices that restrict uses of 
mass individualization techniques. This could help to weaken the hegemony of 
neoclassical-inspired theories and succeed in shifting the focus of innovation in 
artificial intelligence in a way that is conducive to enhancing values associated with 
individual and collective autonomy.  
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